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Abstract
The negative effect of population aging on the economy can be mitigated by a beha-
vioral effect of people as a reaction to a higher life expectancy. We analyze the optimal
life-cycle of individuals that allocate time at the intensive margin between leisure, human
capital accumulation, and labor supply while facing an age-dependent mortality. This
allows to enhance effects of changes in life expectancy on labor supply and human cap-
ital accumulation and to uncover trade-offs between time allocations at different stages of
the life-cycle. Our life-cycles are characterized by on the job training throughout all the
working life with a possibility of a temporary exit from the labor market. We simulate
the model numerically and find that with a higher life expectancy, labor supply increases
at the intensive margin and the individual invests more in human capital. We also find a
willingness to increase labor supply at the extensive margin.
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1 Introduction
We may roughly divide the impact of demographic changes in the economy on an accounting
effect and a behavioral effect. The accounting effect concerns the change of the age structure
of the population. In the case of population aging it is negative. It can be measured by the
deterioration of the ratio of the dependable population on active population. Everything else
constant, a decrease in the proportion of the working-age population puts a strain on the
economy as pension systems, health care, and other social programs have to be funded by a
smaller fraction of the population.
The behavioral effect concerns the reaction of the various agents in the economy to the
demographic transition. As many economies are experiencing population aging, studying this
effect is important because if people invest more in human capital when they expect to live
longer, this may mitigate substantially the negative accounting effect.
In this paper we obtain endogenously the planned life-cycle profiles of consumption, leis-
ure, work effort, accumulation of human capital and financial assets for an individual facing
a mortality law that is age dependent. We set up a model in continuous time in which the
life of an individual starts and ends with zero labor supply, but allows an intermediate stage
in which the three time activities may coexist. Consumers differ only in their age and make
their decisions taking into consideration the existence of an unfunded pension system.
This study can be regarded as the consumer block of a general equilibrium model.1 Since
we want to study how the consumer reacts to changes in life expectancy, we chose to make the
consumer optimize expected lifetime utility, facing in each moment in time an age-dependent
survival law. Besides being realistic, Heijdra and Romp (2008) show that for a life-cycle small
open economy, impulse response functions are very different from those of an economy where
a constant survival law like in Blanchard (1985) is used.
We include some features in the model in order to boost the effects of the consumer re-
action to changes in life expectancy in human capital and labor supply. One of this features
is a human capital externality as in Lucas (1988) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990), which is
also used in studies more close to our what we are doing, as in Boucekkine et al. (2002) and
in Heijdra and Romp (2009a). Another feature is a subsidy for time allocated to schooling,
an idea borrowed from Heijdra and Romp (2009a). This will be useful to simulate economic
policies that can act directly on the creation of human capital. The government has at its dis-
posal several taxes, the gross replacement rate, the retirement age and the years of mandatory
schooling in order to achieve its policy goals.
This is a model of time allocation at the intensive margin. The consumer takes as exogen-
ously defined by the government, the years of mandatory schooling and the retirement age.
Consistent with our goal to highlight behavioral effects related to a higher life expectancy,
either in labor supply or in human capital investment, we defined time allocated to learning
in the intermediate phase as on-the-job training (OJT). Compared to a model of learning by
1In fact it is part of a general equilibrium model developed in Pereira (2018), too large for publication in
one single article.
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doing, using OJT allows the investment in human capital in that phase to be separated from
labor supply.2
Early studies in modeling the consumer’s life-cycle time allocation at the intensive margin
between study, work and leisure are Heckman (1976), Blinder and Weiss (1976), Driffill (1980)
and Ryder et al. (1976). Blinder and Weiss (1976) obtain a large range of possibilities for
the combination of activities and also obtain the possibility of cycling between phases. Driffill
(1980) proves that, in the Blinder and Weiss’s model, if we impose retirement as the last stage
of life, then the possibility of cycling is always ruled out. Ryder et al. (1976) show that a
model with leisure provides a better empirically supported profile of labor supply than the
Ben-Porath (1967) model that maximizes income instead of utility.
More recently, there are several models in which time allocation in learning and work is
considered, but what we are particularly interested are in studies where a survival law is taken
into consideration. For example, Boucekkine et al. (2002) use an age-dependent survival law
in a model with time allocation at the extensive margin. The individual chooses the length of
schooling and the retirement age. Heijdra and Reijnders (2016) work with a fully rectangular
law in a model of learning by doing. Besides choosing the level of schooling and the retire-
ment age, they introduce the decision to supply labor at the intensive margin. In Heijdra and
Reijnders (2018), life uncertainty is introduced with an age-dependent survival law. However,
now time allocation is only at the extensive margin.
Our modeling of time allocation is closer to Ludwig et al. (2012) and Vogel et al. (2017).
In their models, there is an age-dependent survival law and consumers make decisions at an
age where mandatory schooling already happened, deciding on time allocation at the intensive
margin. Human capital accumulation relies upon an OJT process. We extend these papers
by introducing a schooling decision at the intensive margin which makes investment in human
capital endogenous in the entire life-cycle and allows us to uncover some trade-offs between
schooling and OJT. Moreover, we also perform a sensitivity analysis to changes in some key
parameters.
Our analytical results show that we never obtain a phase of only work, as in the ”normal
case” of Blinder and Weiss (1976). There is, however, the possibility to withdraw temporarily
from the labor market in order to increase the investment in human capital. After schooling,
the consumer will always pursue OJT till withdrawing completely from the labor market.
As it is possible to reduce labor supply to zero before the retirement age and once this
happens, it will be permanent, this decision at the intensive margin translates to a decision
at the extensive margin and we may say that the retirement decision is partially endogenous.
The model is flexible enough to allow for a schooling decision at the extensive margin. The
consumer may postpone the entry in the labor market, while having positive time allocated
to studying. Different dynamics and age profiles of time allocation can appear but, with the
parameters we use in the numerical analysis, labor supply, labor income, and human capital
2Although Kuruscu (2006) finds that OJT investments have small effects in increasing lifetime income we
still saw as advantageous for our purposes, the possibility of separating time allocated to training from time
allocated to labor supply. Some examples of models with learning by doing are Imai and Keane (2004) and
Peterman (2016).
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will be concave on age and leisure will be convex.
The numerical simulations suggest that the consumer will react to a longer life expectancy
by increasing labor supply at the intensive margin and be willing to increase it at the extensive
margin and also will increase time investment in human capital. The numerical exercise test
also influences in the individual life-cycle of several changes in parameters and variables, with
an emphasis on government instruments.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the model. The optimization
problem is solved in Section 3. Analytical results are shown in Section 4. In Section, 5 we do
a numerical simulation of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of consumers, that are only heterogen-
eous in their age. The only source of uncertainty in this economy is the individual’s time of
death. We assume the individuals know the age-dependent survival law. What they do not
know is if this survival law will change in the future.
As this is a partial equilibrium model, there are variables that are determined in aggregate
markets which will be considered as given.3 When making her plans we assume that the indi-
vidual has myopic expectations on these variables and on the mortality law, i.e. she expects
them to remain the same throughout her planning horizon.
Regarding notation, we will denote time, generically, as τ with t being the current time,
the time when the planning is made. A subscript ∗t indicates a quantity being forecast or
planned at time t for some time into the future. E.g., X(τ)∗t denotes the value that variable
X is expected or planned to attain at time τ ≥ t, according to forecasts or plans made at time
t. For the variables in which we apply directly the myopic expectations, we have X(τ)∗t = X(t).
We also assume the existence of a perfectly competitive institutional sector that combines
a banking sector and an insurance sector which lends and borrows from consumers. The cost
of borrowing is the same as the return on deposits and is equal to the interest rate plus a
premium risk encompassing the mortality rate. There are no bequests as consumers contract
with the institutional sector and give their net assets position at the time of death as collateral.
2.1 Mortality
The time of death of an individual born at time v is a continuous random variable Tv with
density ϕv:




3In Pereira (2018) we show that most results hold in general equilibrium.
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Consider the functions Mv : R 7→ [0,+∞] defined as
Mv(t) = − ln (1−Φv(t)) , i.e., 1−Φv(t) = e
−Mv(t),
mv(t) = Ṁv(t) =
{
+∞ for Φv(t) = 1
ϕv(t)
1−Φv(t)
for Φv(t) < 1
Assumption 1 The forecasts Φv(τ)∗t, ϕv(τ)∗t, Mv(τ)∗t, m(τ)∗t, are consistent in the sense
that
Φv(τ)∗t = Φv(τ), ϕv(τ)∗t = ϕv(τ), Mv(τ)∗t = Mv(τ), mv(τ)∗t = mv(τ)










hold for every τ > t.
2.2 Time allocation
Total time endowment is normalized to 1. At time τ, for an individual born at time v we have
slv(τ), s
h
v (τ) and s
w
v (τ) as, respectively, the fraction of time allocated to leisure, learning, and
work. The following applies:
slv(τ) + s
w
v (τ) + s
h
v (τ) ≡ 1, siv(τ) ≥ 0 for i = h, l,w.
We define Sv as the age at which mandatory schooling ends (assuming no grade repetition)
and Rv as the imposed retirement age. The consumer’s life-cycle is divided into three phases,
with different properties. In phase 1, for τ ∈ [v, Sv + v], she does not work and specializes in
formal schooling. In phase 2, for τ ∈ [Sv + v, Rv + v], she may work and pursue on-the-job
training.4 Phase 3, for τ ∈ [Rv + v,+∞[, is the retirement period; the consumer does not work
but we do not restrict her from pursuing education5. Therefore,
swv (τ) = 0 for τ ∈ [v, Sv + v] ∪ [Rv + v,+∞[
2.3 Preferences
There is no bequest motive. At each time t ≥ v, the consumer plans her future seeking to
maximize her forecast of the expected utility discounted by her time preference and weighted
4Sv + v is the date at which working activity is allowed to start, but the consumer may choose to pursue
more training and effectively start working later.
5Nevertheless, since in this model the sole purpose of accumulating human capital is to enhance labor income,
there will be no reason for the consumer to accumulate human capital once retired, since it will have no effect
on her earnings.
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Where cv(τ) is consumption at time τ for a consumer born at time v, and ρv(.) is the pure
time preference of a consumer born at time v.


















with φ,σ, ϵ > 0
Lifetime maximization of consumption and leisure is constrained by the dynamics of the bal-
ance sheet, human capital, and a solvency condition.
2.4 Balance sheet
Consider r(τ) the market interest rate at time τ, that consumers have access to. We assume
the existence of a risk-neutral institutional lender. The expected present value at time t ≥ v
































Therefore, the risk-neutral lender is willing to lend/borrow a given amount for a mortal
agent born at time v with a premium over the pure financial market rate that is equal to the
instantaneous death rate, mv.
Until the event of death, the balance sheet evolves according to the dynamics
ȧv(τ)∗t = [r(τ)∗t +mv(τ)∗t]av(τ)∗t − cv(τ)∗t − z0(τ)∗t + d(τ)∗t+
+ ev(τ)∗tχ[v,Sv∗t+v](τ)+
+ (1− zl(τ)∗t)ωv(τ)∗tχ[Sv∗t+v,Rv∗t+v](τ)+ (2)
+ (1− zp(τ)∗t)pv∗tχ[Rv∗t,+∞[(τ), for τ ≤ Tv.
During the period [v, Sv + v] the consumer receives an educational grant (ev(τ)), in the period
[Sv + v, Rv + v] the consumer receives labor income (ωv(τ)) and, when retired, [R(v)+v),+∞[,
receives a pension benefit (pv). In case the consumer chooses to withdraw from the labor
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market before the retirement age, she will have no source of income between that period and
the retirement age.6 The variable d(τ) represents flows from aggregate markets, like dividends
or other financial returns from the capital market, and z0(τ), zl(τ), zp(τ) are, respectively, a
lump sum tax, a labor income tax and a tax on pension benefits.
The consumer has the following myopic expectations:
r(τ)∗t = r(t), d(τ)∗t = d(t), Sv∗t = Sv, Rv∗t = Rv, z0(τ)∗t = z0(t),
zl(τ)∗t = zl(t), zp(τ)∗t = zp(t)
The educational grant is proportional to the fraction of the time dedicated to study and




With γe(τ) being an educational subsidy and w(τ) the wage rate. For both the consumer has
myopic expectations:
γe(τ)∗t = γe(t), w(τ)∗t = w(t)





The pension function depends on accumulated labor earnings up to the exogenous retire-


















Where θ(τ) ≥ 0 is a policy parameter akin to the gross replacement rate, and Rv, the legal
retirement age, is the minimum age of entitlement to a pension benefit. The consumer has
myopic expectations on the parameter:
θ(τ)∗t = θ(t)
6We follow, here, Heijdra and Romp (2009b).
7The purpose of introducing the educational grant ev(τ), following Heijdra and Romp Heijdra and Romp
(2009a), in the model is to mimic educational expenses of the government, which can be used as a tool to
provide a further incentive to accumulate human capital.
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2.5 Human capital
We assume that the production function of human capital is the same during the entire life-
cycle. This means that, qualitatively, human capital acquired during the period of specializ-
ation in schooling is the same as the human capital acquired during the phase of work. This
implies that OJT in phase 2 must have a generic nature and not be firm-specific (the same
as schooling). Together with the assumptions of a perfectly competitive labor market and
perfectly competitive production sectors in which labor is used, there is no incentive for firms
to pay for employees training, as these may leave the firm and move on to other firms. Hence,
all costs of accumulating human capital would be supported by the worker, in the form of
foregone earnings and direct outlays. For simplification purposes we assume that there are no
direct outlays and the only cost incurred by the worker has the form of foregone earnings or
less leisure.





∗t − δh.hv(τ)∗t hv(v) = 0, or
hv(t)∗t = hv(t) for t > v. (4)
Where ξh > 0 is a productivity parameter, δh > 0 measures the human capital erosion, ϕh ∈
(0, 1) measures the extent of marginal returns to the time of study, and all these parameters are
constants. η(τ) introduces an intergenerational externality linked to the average per capita
human capital (h̄) in the economy, with strength ϕη. We allow average human capital to
contribute to the accumulation of human capital with a different impact than time dedicated
to studying. There are myopic expectations in the externality,
η(τ)∗t = η(t)
The externality is computed as




with lv(t) = Lv(t)/L(t) being the weight of the cohort born in v that survived to time t,
(Lv(t)), on total population at time t, (L(t)).
2.6 Solvency condition
The consumer is subject to a solvency condition. The expected present value of the balance










































Thus, a risk-neutral lender will agree to finance the life-cycle strategy of a consumer only
if:






r(θ)∗t+mv(θ)∗tdθdτ ≥ 0 (6)











, τ > t, satisfying (5)-(6) with cv(τ)∗t > 0,
a.e. τ > t.
3 Optimization problem
3.1 Statement of the problem












































with initial (consistency) conditions:
hv(t)∗t = hv(t), πv(t)∗t = πv(t), av(t)∗t = av(t), bv(t)∗t = 0, (12)
and terminal (solvency) condition:
lim
τ→+∞bv(τ)∗t ≥ 0 (13)
The controls satisfy:





v (τ)∗t ∈ [0,+∞[, a.e. τ ∈ [t,+∞[; (15)
slv(τ)∗t + s
h
v (τ)∗t + s
w
v (τ)∗tχ[S(v)∗t+v,Rv+v](τ) = 1, a.e. τ ∈ [t,+∞[; (16)
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We now proceed to solve the consumer’s optimization problem via the Pontryagin’s Max-
imum Principle. Due to the fairly simple dynamics in the retirement period, we opted to
separate the maximization problem in two periods. In the next section we compute the value
of maximized utility for the period τ ∈ [Rv,+∞[. Then we use this result, which can be inter-
preted as the value of retirement, to solve an optimization problem with free terminal value
and fixed terminal time for τ ∈ [t, Rv[.
3.2 Consumption allocation after retirement
In the following, we omit all subscripts v, ∗t, being understood that we are dealing with a given
(fixed) demographic cohort v and all quantities relative to a moment τ ≥ t are forecasts (and
hence the subscript ∗t is implicit). Variables to which the static expectation applies directly
(are a function of t and do not change during the planning period), will be written as constants.
After retirement, all income is provided by pensions and interest. Since human capital is
worth only for its use in the labor market, maximal utility after retirement is obtained with









ρ(θ)+m(θ)dθdτ → max, (17)








with πR given and initial conditions
a(R) = aR, b(R) = bR (20)

















Now, for any locally essentially bounded c : [R,+∞[ 7→ [0,+∞[ let (Λc, ac, bc) denote the tra-
jectories of (18)-(19), (21) with Λc(R) = 0. Suppose that lim
τ→+∞b0(τ) > 0 (i.e., the consumer
has some margin for consumption after retirement) and let ĉ be an optimal control for prob-












subject to (18)-(19), (13), (14), (20), and boundary conditions
a(T1) = aĉ(T1), b(T1) = bĉ(T1) (23)
Hence ĉ|[R,T1] satisfies the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle with boundary conditions (20),
(23). The Hamiltonian function is



















By the PMP, there is an absolutely continuous curve (λ0(τ), λ3(τ), λ4(τ)) with τ ∈ [R, T1] solv-



































H(τ, aĉ(τ),bĉ(τ), λ0(τ), λ3(τ), λ4(τ), ĉ(τ)) =
= max
c≥0
H(τ, aĉ(τ), bĉ(τ), λ0(τ), λ3(τ), λ4(τ), c) a.e. τ ∈ [R, T1]. (26)
(λ0(T1), λ3(T1), λ4(T1)) can be set equal to any vector supporting the Pontryagin cone at time
T1. Since λ̇0 ≡ λ̇4 ≡ 0, we have λ0 ≡ λ0(T1), λ4 ≡ λ4(T1).
Let (Λ̃, ã, b̃) denote a solution of (18)-(19), (21) in the interval [T1,+∞[ with c(τ) = ĉ(τ)
a.e. τ ≥ T1.
Then, for any T2 > T1, we have
Λ̃(T2) −Λĉ(T2) = Λ̃(T1) −Λĉ(T1)



















Suppose there is a control c̃ : [R, T1] 7→ [0,+∞[ such that
Λc̃(T1) > Λĉ(T1) and ac̃(T1) > aĉ(T1)
Then (27) shows that the control
c(τ) =
{
c̃, τ ∈ [R, T1]
ĉ, τ > T1
satisfies
lim
τ→+∞Λc(τ) = limτ→+∞Λĉ(τ) +Λc̃(T1) −Λĉ(T1)
lim
τ→+∞bc(τ) = +∞
i.e., c satisfies the solvency condition and provides larger lifetime utility, a contradiction to
the optimality of ĉ. Hence, any point (Λ̃, ã, b̃) with Λ̃ > Λĉ(T1) and ã > aĉ(T1) cannot be
reached from (0, aR, bR) by a trajectory of the system (18), (19), (21). It follows that the
Pontryagin cone and the cone [0,+∞[2×R have non-overlapping interiors. Therefore we can
pick (λ0, λ3(T1), λ4(T1)) such that
λ0v0 + λ3(T1)v3 + λ4v4 ≥ 0 ∀ v0 ≥ 0, v3 ≥ 0, v4 ∈ R, (28)
which is equivalent to λ0 ≥ 0, λ3(T1) ≥ 0, λ4 = 0
If λ0 = 0, then (26) implies ĉ ≡ 0, and therefore Λĉ(T1) = 0. This is non-optimal because
we are assuming the consumer has some margin for consumption after retirement. The exist-
ence of this margin implies that Λĉ(T1) > 0, for some T1 which is contradictory with λ0 = 0.
Thus, we conclude that we must have λ0 > 0, but since the Hamiltonian System is homogen-
eous with respect to (λ0, λ3, λ4), we can normalize and set λ0 = 1.
Since λ4 ≡ 0 we have
λ̇3(τ) = −(r+m(τ))λ3(τ) a.e. τ ∈ [R, T1] (29)
Therefore, λ3(T1) = 0 implies λ3 ≡ 0, but in this case, (26) has no solution. This shows that































Since T1 is arbitrary, we see that ĉ satisfies (25) and (30) with λ0 = 0, λ4 = 0 in all the interval
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[R,+∞[, i.e., the optimal consumption is known up to the parameter λ3(R). Substituting ĉ in























































Let Ψi = lim
τ→+∞Ψi(τ), i = 1, 2, 3. These limits are finite and hence[






aR + Ψ1πR − Ψ2 − Ψ3λ3(R)
−1/σ
]
< 0 then lim




aR + Ψ1πR − Ψ2 − Ψ3λ3(R)
−1/σ
]
> 0, then lim
τ→+∞bĉ(τ) = +∞ i.e. ĉ satisfies the solvency
constraint and still leaves some margin for further consumption.
Finally, in the case
[
aR + Ψ1πR − Ψ2 − Ψ3λ3(R)
−1/σ
]
= 0, this is not incompatible with
any value of lim
τ→+∞bĉ(τ) (including ±∞), thus our problem (17)-(19), (13) may fail to have a
solution. In other words, it is not guaranteed that there is not a solution that returns either
lim
τ→+∞b(τ) = +∞ (not optimal) or limτ→+∞b(τ) = −∞ (not solvent).
This means that we must trade the solvency condition (13) by a weaker version. Hence,
we shall assume that starting with[




in order to exclude the possibility of lim
τ→+∞b(τ) = −∞ the individual will pursue a strategy
that, by a satiation argument, will increase consumption until all the slackness has been used.
This weaker solvency condition is:[




From this expression we arrive at λ3(R):
λ3 (R) =
[





Since consumption is restricted to be non-negative, (30) and (32), imply that
aR + Ψ1πR − Ψ2 ≥ 0 (33)




































3.3 The optimization problem reformulated





































With the initial conditions in (12) and the controls satisfying:





v (τ)∗t ∈ [0,+∞[, a.e. τ ∈ [t, Rv∗t]; (40)
slv(τ)∗t + s
h
v (τ)∗t + s
w
v (τ)∗tχ[v+S(v)∗t,Rv+v](τ) = 1, a.e. τ ∈ [t, Rv∗t]; (41)
For this new time frame we have to consider a different solvency condition. Let Tm denote the
continuous random variable time of death. We can write the solvency condition as:







∣∣∣t < Tm ≤ Rv∗t]+




















∣∣∣Tm > Rv∗t, c.χ[Rv∗t,+∞[ ≡ 0]
The inequality (42) cannot be removed by any saturation argument because its slackness results
from the trade-off between utility before and after retirement, i.e. we need to exclude the









∣∣∣Tm > Rv∗t, c.χ[Rv∗t,+∞[ ≡ 0] > 0 (43)






























t r(θ)∗t+mv(θ)∗tdθdτ > 0













− z0(θ1)∗t + d(θ1)∗t)dθ1 > 0
or
av(Rv∗t) + Ψ1∗tπR∗t − Ψ2∗t > 0 (44)
The following proposition formally expresses the solution for the present problem.
Proposition 3 If the cohort v is solvent then for the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle apply-
ing to (35), (36)-(38), (39)-(41) we have that if (ĥ, π̂, â, ĉ, ŝl, ŝh, ŝw) is an optimal solution to
(7)-(16), there is an absolutely continuous curve (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3), not identically null, solving
the Hamiltonian system:8




















λ̇1 = δhλ1 − [λ2 + λ3 (1− zl)]ws
wχ[S,R];
λ̇2 = 0;
λ̇3 = − [r(τ) +m(τ)] λ3;
with transversality conditions for the adjoints
λ0 (R) = 1
λ1 (R) = 0


















































, for ∀τ ∈ [t,+∞[


















+ λ3γew and ŝ
h = 1− ŝl if λ1 > 0
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For τ ∈ [S, R]:
λ1(τ) = 0 ⇒ τ = R,












(λ2 + (1− zl)λ3)wh
)1/1−ϕ
,










, ŝh = 1− ŝl, ŝw = 0
satisfying the maximal condition
H(λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, ĥ, π̂, â, ĉ, ŝ














Plus, the Erdmann condition:




∂H(λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, ĥ, π̂, â, ĉ, ŝ
l, ŝh, ŝw)
∂τ
The proof is in Appendix A.
4 Life-cycle properties
Our model is complex enough to not allow many analytical deductions. Most results will be
derived from numerical simulation. There are, however, some results that can be deduced
analytically. This section deals with them.
4.1 There is no phase of pure work and OJT lasts till retirement
In this model there will never be a phase of pure work (sl > 0, sh = 0, sw > 0). This is the
case λ1 = 0 for τ ∈ [S, R] in the proof to Proposition 3 but we explain it here in more detail.
We can see this by starting from the transversality condition λ1(R) = 0. By inspection of the
differential equation λ̇1 = δhλ1−[λ2 + λ3(1− zl)]w.s
wχ[S,R] we see that we must have λ1(τ) ≥ 0
for τ < R. If λ1, became negative it could never recover to zero at the retirement age, because
it would require a negative sw which is impossible. From (52) we can see that the expression
for time sh, when the three time activities are positive, depends on λ1 in a way that it will have
the same sign of λ1. So, starting in a position where s
h > 0, if the consumer wanted to leave
OJT, sh = 0 requires λ1 = 0. But since λ1 cannot be negative, if it reaches zero, it will require
sw = 0, meaning the consumer can only stop OJT if she stops working simultaneously. But,
when this happens, sw > 0 can never happen again, otherwise λ1(τ) ≥ 0 would be violated.
This means that the consumer will always pursue OJT till a point where she retires, either at
R or before, if she chooses to withdraw the labor market. When she withdraws from the labor
market, it will be permanent.
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4.2 Temporary exits from the labor market
The consumer may choose to leave temporarily the labor market to pursue a specialization in
training (sl > 0, sh > 0, sw = 0). Following our discussion in the previous section, it remains
to see the condition in which she will choose to leave temporarily the labor market. Due
to high non-linearities and the great number of free parameters it is not possible to provide
unambiguously analytical answers to this question.
We may state, however, the general conditions for temporary entries and exits from the













(λ2(τ) + (1− zl)λ3(τ))wh(τ)
) 1
1−ϕh
Where Z(τ) is the sum of leisure and OJT (sl + sh). Suppose we arrive at a given point in
time from a regime in which sw > 0, then a regime with sw = 0 is entered if:
Z(τ) = 1, Ż(τ) > 0, or
Z(τ) = 1, Ż(τ) = 0 ∧ Z̈(τ) ≥ 0
On the other hand, suppose we arrive at a given point in time from a regime in which sw = 0,
then a regime with sw > 0 is entered if:
Z(τ) = 1, Ż(τ) < 0, or
Z(τ) = 1, Ż(τ) = 0 ∧ Z̈(τ) ≤ 0
If we derive Z(τ), using the fact that at this particular point, Z(τ) = 1, time allocation
is (sw = 0, sl = 1 − sh), using the differential equations ((48)-(50)) and the transversality
condition for λ2 in (45), we arrive, after some algebra at:
Ż(τ) = δh
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.(1− sh(τ))(1− ϕh) + s
h(τ)ϵ(r(τ) +m(τ))(1− zl)
]
For a temporary exit from the labor market to occur the expression must have a positive
sign, but we cannot determine its sign and is difficult to make conclusions on the parameters
influence, because of the feedback effects they will have on variables sh and h. However, it
seems to suggest that if it happens, it is likely to be early in life, because the exponential will
have a lower value. A lower η, a higher δ and r > ρ can make it more likely if the feedback
effects are not too strong.
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4.3 Time allocation profiles
Here, we provide some insights into the time allocation age profiles. Throughout this section,
we assume that we are in a life-cycle without temporary exits from the labor market.
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r(θ)+m(θ)dθ + (1− zl)
− (ρ(τ) +m(τ))
For the above result we used the differential equations ((49)-(50)) and the transversality con-
dition for λ2 in (45).
When the growth rate of human capital is high enough, leisure will be decreasing. When
the growth rate of human capital decreases sufficiently, leisure will increase. It is useful to













r(θ)+m(θ)dθ + (1− zl)
Our analysis will be restricted to the case where ρ and r are constant. For r ≤ ρ the turning
point of leisure will always involve a decreasing growth rate of human capital, while if r > ρ it
is possible to have leisure growth changing sign while human capital has an increasing growth
rate.
Regarding the evolution of labor supply, our numerical simulations result in a single peak.
In this case, since sw = 1− sl − sh, in the peak we have ṡw = −ṡl − ṡh = 0 or ṡl = −ṡh. If, at
that point, ḣ(τ)
h(τ) is sufficiently small, then leisure will be increasing and time devoted to study
must be decreasing. In this case, as leisure is increasing it means that the peak in labor supply
will occur after the minimum in leisure.
With a single peak in labor supply, labor income will tend to have also a single peak. As
labor income is h.w.sw the peak will occur when ḣ(τ)
h(τ) +
ṡw(τ)
sw(τ) = 0. In this case, if the growth
rate of human capital is negative, which occurs when human capital production is lower than
depreciation, the peak in labor income will be consistent with an increase in labor supply,
which means the peak in labor income will occur before the peak in labor supply.
Summarizing we have the following results. If ḣ(τ)
h(τ) is small enough when labor supply
peaks, this peak happens after the minimum in leisure. Furthermore, if this growth rate of
human capital is negative when the peak in labor income occurs, this peak occurs before the
peak in labor supply. A pattern we will see often, as in Table 2 is the minimum in leisure
being followed by the peak in labor income and afterward by the peak in labor supply.
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5 Numerical simulation
We now present numerical simulations for the consumer’s life-cycle model. In Subsection 5.2
we simulate various life-cycles with different parameter sets. Our aim is just to illustrate how
these parameters influence the life-cycle planning of the consumer. In Subsection 5.3 we ana-
lyze how planned life-cycles change in response to a different mortality law, specifically one
associated with a higher life expectancy.
As the model has many free parameters, the type of analysis performed in this section
does not aim to provide a definitive answer on the typical life-cycle of a consumer and its
variations. A more robust analysis would require a much more intensive numerical exercise
covering a wider range in the domain of the parameters set.
5.1 Calibration
As Portugal is a small open economy undergoing a process of population aging, the choice of
some parameters will rely on the Portuguese economy.
In Table 1 we present various sets of parameters related to our baseline and alternative
scenarios. The choice of parameters for this scenario was based on a mix of values obtained
from data, from existing literature and also with a view for the aggregate economy to display
the desired levels for some key ratios.
The interest rate r was set to 3%. This value is in line with the average long-term real
interest for Portugal since 1993 (10-year government bonds) extracted from the AMECO data-
base, which is the annual macroeconomic database of the European Commission’s Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs. We use a constant value of 0.02 for the subjective
time preference which is a value commonly used in the economic literature.
The parameter σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption. We set
σ = 2 which is also commonly used in the literature. The parameter ϵ determines the labor
supply elasticity, so its value will depend on the level of labor supply elasticity intended. The
literature, however, provides estimates of the Frisch elasticity that differ a lot, depending on
whether they are obtained from micro or macro data. Micro estimates tend to be much lower
than macro estimates. Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty (2012) tackle this issue and make the
case for Frisch elasticities to be low, more in accordance to the values usually provided by
micro estimates.9 The former study recommends calibrating the models in order to obtain
Frisch elasticities at the intensive margin of 0.5. We set ϵ = 4, resulting on an average Frisch
elasticity for employed cohorts of 0.437.
Regarding the human capital elasticity ϕh, Browning et al. (1999) (Table 2.3) report val-
ues ranging from 0.5 to 1. Heckman et al. (1998), for a human capital model including OJT,
estimate values for this elasticity of 0.945 and 0.939, depending on the level of education.
Hansen and Imrohoroğlu (2008), in order to replicate some of the estimates of Heckman et al.
(1998) regarding lifetime time allocation between OJT and labor supply, set the elasticity at
9Imai and Keane (2004) find that labor elasticity is higher once human capital accumulation is endogenized,
but they use a model with learning by doing.
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0.001. In our model ϕh represents elasticity not only for schooling but also to OJT. Taking
into consideration that schooling represents a major part of the human capital accumulated
and the low estimate in Hansen and Imrohoroğlu (2008) we decided to set it at 0.5, the lower
bound of the estimates surveyed by Browning et al. (1999).
We introduced a human capital externality to capture the idea that more developed eco-
nomies will probably have better institutions, namely teaching institutions. The literature on
human capital externalities is reviewed in Moretti (2004b) which reports some mixed evid-
ence. We follow here his exposition for models based on wage and land prices. Some studies,
as Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Ciccone and Peri (2002), do not find statistically signi-
ficant externalities. Rauch (1993) finds externalities ranging from 3% to 5% but does not take
into consideration endogeneity and complementarity issues. Moretti (2004a) tackles the issue
of the presence of unobservable characteristics of individuals and cities and finds externalities
ranging from 0.4% to 1.9% depending on the education level. We decided to set ϕη at 1%,
within the range of these last estimates.
Regarding δh, Arrazola and de Hevia (2004) estimate the depreciation rate of human cap-
ital taking into consideration OJT for a sample of the Spanish population and find depreciation
rates around 1% to 1.5%. Weber (2014) applies the same model as in Arrazola and de Hevia
for Switzerland, with a further disaggregation by education level, and finds depreciation rates
of 0.6%-0.7% for general education and slightly higher for specific education (0.9%-1%). Tak-
ing these studies in consideration we chose a value of 1% for human capital depreciation.
We use data from Portugal for the fiscal parameters. Our parameter zl represents the
wedge between the costs of employment to a firm and the net labor income received by the
worker. It includes labor tax, contributions to social security by the worker and also by the
firm. We set zl = 0.1223+0.11+0.2375 = 0.4698, with 0.1223 being the approximate effective
income tax, 0.11 the contributions of employees to social security and 0.2375 the contribution
of employers to social security.10 We set zp = 0.1223, the same effective income tax used in zl.
Our measure of the gross replacement rate needs an adjustment to be comparable to what
is obtained in the data, as gross labor income received by the worker in a real economy would
be related to the one in this model by the term (1 − 0.2375). We take the gross replacement
rate value of 0.74 for Portugal from the OECD (2017) and set θ = 0.74∗(1−0.2375) = 0.56425.
Mandatory schooling in Portugal has been raised to 12 years of schooling which students
will conclude with 18 years old in case of no grade retention (S = 18). Regarding the minimum
eligible retirement age for Portugal, a benchmark value in the private sector was, for many
years, 65 years. The retirement age has been rising due to the introduction of a sustainable
factor that has the effect of linking it to the evolution of life expectancy. It sits currently at
66 years and a few months. We decided to use the value R = 66.
We are still left with several parameters to determine (φ, ξh, γe, z0) as well as the wage rate
and the human capital externality. We made the calibration exercise for a general equilibrium
10The effective income tax rate was computed from the statistics of Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira for
the year 2015. The rates for social security contributions are the statutory ones.
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model in which we tried to obtain the economy’s ratios consistent to those of a real economy
and a specific goal for the government’s deficit (below 3%). We also wanted to achieve a con-
cave profile for average labor supply and a population’s plausible average labor supply around
1/3 of total time. The full calibration exercise is in Pereira (2018) and we arrived at the values
φ = 0.8, ξh = 0.0381, γe = 0.288, z0 = 0.0485, η ≈ 0.992611 and w = 4.5. With these values
we achieve the economy’s ratios over GDP of 62.3% for consumption, 19.1% for investment,
and -2.1% for the government’s deficit as well as an average labor supply of 34.7% of total
time, slightly higher than our initial goal.
Table 1 presents the result of the calibration for the base scenario and some alternative
parameter values that will be tested.
Table 1: Parameter sets
















zl 0.4698 0.5198 0.3598
zp 0.1223
θ 0.56425 0.488 0
11We use the symbol ≈ because the numerical program runs with many more decimal points.
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Figure 1: Base scenario and scenario with a higher wage rate (w = 6.0)
5.2 Analysis of life-cycles under different parameterizations
In Table 2 we present a set of indicators for selected scenarios which will guide us through
the following discussion. The base scenario is characterized by no temporary exits from the
labor market, with the consumer starting to work immediately after the mandatory age of
compulsory schooling, (S) and continuing till the legal retirement age. This scenario is shown
in Figure 1 (grey plot). The life-cycle displays hump-shaped patterns in labor supply and labor
income and convexly shaped profile in leisure which are in accordance with empirical findings.
These patterns are pervasive to all scenarios we tested. In phase 2 of the life-cycle, the peaks
in human capital, labor income, and labor supply occur by this order and the minimum of
leisure occurs before the maximum in labor income. This sequence also occurs in all scenarios
we tested and it matches our discussion in Subsection 4.3. In the base scenario, minimum
leisure occurs at age 35, the peak in human capital at age 51, the peak in labor income at age
55 and the peak in labor supply at age 60.
Comparing our results with the ”normal” case in Blinder and Weiss (1976) we have a sim-
ilar age profile of leisure and a single peak in labor supply. However the sequence of the peaks
is different. In their paper, the peak in labor supply occurs before the one in human capital.
For the case of no depreciation, they find that human capital peaks after labor income and we
obtain the same result when we tested δh = 0.
Consumption is monotonous, not replicating empirical findings that show that lifetime
consumption is hump-shaped. This is a consequence of our choice to work with an additively
separable utility function in consumption and leisure.
We start by considering a scenario that we would see materializing as the economy devel-
ops, which is a higher wage rate. This scenario is presented in Figure 1 (dashed red), in which
a wage rate of 6 was considered, an increase of 33.3% when compared to the base scenario.
As expected, labor income is higher, lifetime consumption is higher and so is lifetime utility.
Assets also increase. More interesting is to notice that when the wage rate increases, people
will substitute labor supply and time dedicated to study for leisure which will result in a lower
human capital. This partial equilibrium result goes in the same direction as the general equi-
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Figure 2: Base scenario and scenario with a lower interest rate (r = 0.025)
librium result of Vogel et al. (2017).12 This substitution is mild compared to the increase in
the wage rate, not preventing the increase in lifetime consumption. Peaks in human capital,
labor supply, labor income and the trough in leisure all occur earlier than before.
In Figure 2 we show the effect of a reduction in the interest rate, from 0.03 to 0.025. Since
it will still remain above the subjective time preference, consumption still rises during the
lifetime, although at a slower rate. However, since the consumer had a positive net assets
balance, their return will be lower. That is why total lifetime consumption will be lower.
Regarding time allocation, the consumer substitutes leisure for time allocated to study and
labor. A reduction in this interest rate can have a positive effect on GDP growth as labor
supply and human capital increase. There is a higher investment in OJT at the start of the
work-life, resulting in an initial lower labor supply that is recovered later in the life-cycle. This
means that labor supply is postponed and study and leisure are anticipated, in comparison
to the base scenario. This can be seen in Table 2. Labor supply and labor income have their
peak 3 years later and the trough in leisure occurs at age 49.
Another area with interest is related to the human capital parameters. The higher the
human capital externality η and the productivity parameter ξh, the more productive is the
time dedicated to studying. Also, the lower the depreciation rate of human capital the longer
knowledge will stick. So we tested scenarios in which ξh is higher (Figure 3) and δh is lower
(Figure 4).13
In both cases, human capital increases throughout the life-cycle, resulting in higher labor
income and higher lifetime consumption. However, an increase in the productivity parameter
ξh by 10% has little effect on the time allocation profiles (there is a slight trade-off of schooling
for OJT) while the decrease in δh has some similar effects to a decrease in the interest rate
in the sense that it anticipates leisure and postpones labor supply. A reduction in the de-
preciation rate decreases time dedicated to schooling with little effect in OJT. The consumer
allocates less time to accumulating human capital because now it does not depreciate and she
12Ludwig et al. (2012) report an increase in the average labor supply as the economy progresses but that
result is affected by changes in the age composition of the population.
13Since, in partial equilibrium, the effects of an increase in ξh are the same as for an increase in η, we will
not run a scenario for the latter case.
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Table 2: Selected scenarios indicators
Base w = 6 ξ = 0.0419 δh = 0 S = 21 r = 0.025
Lifetime Utility -139.7 -115.2 -135.6 -129.2 -135.2 -141.4
Age entry lab mkt. 19 19 19 19 22 19
Retirement age 66 66 66 66 66 66
Yrs in lab mkt. 47 47 47 47 44 47
Age at Peak h 51 50 51 66 49 51
Age at Peak sw 60 59 60 65 60 63
Age at Peak ω 55 54 55 65 54 58
Age at Min sl 35 34 35 53 31 49
Av. sl phase2 0.606 0.637 0.604 0.600 0.611 0.587
Av. sh phase 2 0.047 0.043 0.048 0.047 0.040 0.056
Av. sw phase 2 0.347 0.319 0.348 0.353 0.349 0.357
Av. h phase 2 0.524 0.506 0.575 0.678 0.549 0.539
π at R 39.59 46.97 43.65 52.94 39.06 42.10
a at R 3.05 4.04 2.78 2.00 3.06 1.84
Base zl = 0.5198 θ = 0.488 R = 68 θ = 0 θ = 0, zl = 0.3598
Lifetime Utility -139.7 -143.4 -140.3 -140.0 -144.3 -136.36
Age entry lab mkt. 19 19 19 19 19 19
Retirement age 66 66 66 68 66 66
Yrs in lab mkt. 47 47 47 49 47 47
Age at Peak h 51 51 51 52 50 50
Age at Peak sw 60 60 59 61 53 53
Age at Peak ω 55 55 55 56 51 52
Age at Min sl 35 35 34 34 28 29
Av. sl phase2 0.606 0.608 0.607 0.609 0.614 0.608
Av. sh phase 2 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.044
Av. sw phase 2 0.347 0.345 0.346 0.344 0.343 0.347
Av. h phase 2 0.524 0.526 0.523 0.527 0.518 0.516
π at R 39.59 39.47 39.49 41.17 38.67 39.00
a at R 3.05 2.79 3.78 2.90 8.37 8.97




























































Figure 3: Base scenario and scenario with higher productivity in human capital (ξh = 0.0419)
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Figure 4: Base scenario and scenario without human capital depreciation (δh = 0)




























































Figure 5: Base scenario and scenario with a higher educational subsidy (γe = 0.317)
does not need to compensate for the depreciation.
There are two more situations that we can consider to impact human capital accumulation,
such as an increase in the years of mandatory schooling which translates to an increase in S
or a more generous educational grant. Unlike the previous analysis, these changes do not af-
fect the productivity of learning, they are exogenous incentives targeted to raise human capital.
We tested an increase in the educational subsidy of 10%, setting γe = 0.317, which is
shown in Figure 5 and an increase in the mandatory schooling of 3 years, which students will
complete ate age 21 as we assume no grade retention, shown in Figure 6.
With this 10% increase in the educational subsidy, the consumer accumulates slightly less
human capital, as time allocated to learning, either for schooling or OJT decreases slightly.
This is a result of the income effect being stronger than the substitution effect. Human capital
is used to produce labor income in order to fund consumption. The increase in the educational
subsidy would make the consumer willing to substitute leisure for studying in phase 1 of the
life-cycle, but at the same time, it has a strong impact on income which makes the increase of
lifetime consumption possible with slightly less human capital. The consumer takes advantage
of this by reducing the time dedicated to study and labor in favor of leisure. In Figure 5,
we see that the consumer is better off as she can increase simultaneously consumption and
leisure. Hence, this policy measure, although having strong welfare effects fails as an incentive
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Figure 6: Base scenario and scenario with more mandatory schooling (S = 21)
to human capital accumulation as human capital supplied to market decreases by around 1%.
An exogenous increase in the years of mandatory schooling has a similar effect of reducing
time allocated to study at any age, except the ages at which schooling was increased. Since
there is a big difference between time allocated to learning in schooling and in OJT, these
3 extra years give a boost to human capital at the initial of the work life, that will tend to
fade as the consumer approaches retirement. Still, with this parametrization, an increase in
mandatory schooling increases average human capital supplied to the market by 4.7%. Also,
contrary to the case of an increase in the educational grant, labor supply increases.
Summing up the analysis of the human capital parameters, a higher ξh (or η), a lower
δh and an increase in S have all the same effect of raising human capital and labor supply,
and if this holds in general equilibrium, are growth enhancing, while an increase in γe has the
opposite effect. Since, in this model, only S and γe are policy instruments, the government
can promote human capital accumulation by increasing S and decreasing γe.
We now turn to scenarios related to the case where the government has a problem of sus-
tainability of the pension system due to an adverse demography and simulate some policy
measures that can be used. The goal, at this point, is just to observe the effects on people’s
life-cycles. We consider four base policies that the government can use to keep public debt
under control: an increase in the contribution rate, a decrease in the gross replacement rate,
an increase in the retirement age and a decrease in educational subsidy. This last case has the
opposite effect of the increase in γe, which was already analyzed above, so we focus on the
remaining three.
We do an exercise for zl = 0.5198, five percentage points higher than the base scenario
and present this case in Figure 7. Although labor supply is reduced slightly, it does not have
much impact on the time allocation profiles. When we tested a decrease of the gross replace-
ment rate to 0.488, the more significant change in time allocation is a substitution of OJT for
schooling. In this scenario, which is presented in Figure 8, the consumer saves more during the
pre-retirement period in order to finance consumption in retirement, because now the pension
is less generous. This effect can raise substantially domestic savings with a strong impact on
foreign debt moving the economy towards a net creditor position.
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Figure 7: Base scenario and scenario with higher labor income taxes (zl = 0.5198)




























































Figure 8: Base scenario and scenario with a cut in pensions (θ = 0.488)
An increase in the retirement age to 68 years (Figure 9), slightly decreases labor supply
at the intensive margin but this is more than compensated by the increase at the extensive
margin. It also promotes human capital accumulation by an increase in OJT, although this is
not clear in Table 2 as the average is computed for a longer period, in which OJT is slowing
down. The combination of a slightly higher human capital and a slightly lower labor supply
at the intensive margin makes taxable gross labor income not very different in both scenarios
till age 66, but the government may collect two extra years of taxes and will save two years in
pensions. Also, because the pension is a function of average labor income, it will be slightly
lower as labor income in the extra two years is on a descending trajectory. These three effects
combined suggest that this measure could be particularly effective in tackling social security
sustainability problems.
Finally, we want to consider the case where a pure capitalization pension system is in place,
which is shown in Figure 10. We assume that this is a voluntary system where workers would
contribute the same amount as what they would save in case no pension system existed. We
set θ = 0.0 and we reduce labor income taxes (zl = 0.3598) reducing zl by the fraction that we
considered to be the contribution of the worker (11%). We do not consider a further reduction
of 23.75%, the contribution of the employer, because this will not accrue to the net income of
the worker.
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Figure 9: Base scenario and scenario with an increase in the retirement age (R = 68)





























































Figure 10: Base scenario and scenario with a pure capitalization pension system (θ = 0, zl =
0.3598)
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Figure 11: Base scenario and scenario with the transition from a PAYG pension system to a
capitalization pension system (θ = 0)
With this pension system, naturally, savings will be higher. Gross labor income will be
lower because, faced with fewer taxes, this income effect will translate into a lower time al-
located to study (with a higher impact on schooling). Average human capital supplied to the
market will be lower (0.516 versus 0.524). Nevertheless, since net labor income is higher, the
consumer accumulates enough assets for retirement and will enjoy higher lifetime consump-
tion. Average labor supply is virtually the same although there is a transference of work effort
from older to younger ages.
We also analyzed the case of a fully funded pension but without the reduction in zl. This
scenario, presented in Figure 11, could be a proxy for the transition phase from a PAYG
pension system to a fully funded one. Comparing with the previous scenario, the decrease in
human capital is now due solely to OJT as there is no decrease in schooling. If we compare
with the base scenario, there is a trade-off between OJT to schooling. Another difference is
that occurs a decrease in labor supply. This transition phase reduces the consumer lifetime
utility because of a strong reduction in consumption that is not sufficiently compensated by
the increase in leisure.
5.3 Analysis of life-cycles under mortality changes
We now study how a mortality law that generates a higher life expectancy affects the consumer
plans. We will not test all scenarios of the previous section. Instead, we apply it to the base
scenario and check the robustness of the results with a couple of other scenarios. These are
Gompertz-Makeham mortality functions based on data and projections for Portugal. Figure
12 compares the survival laws produced by both mortality functions. The mortality function
used in the previous subsection is labeled as the mortality function for the year 2020 and now
we use the mortality function estimated for Portugal for 2080.14. With these survival laws,
life expectancy at birth increases from 82.1 in 2020 to 85.7 in 2080, while life expectancy at
65 increases from 18.1 to 21.3. There is an increase of 4.4% on life expectancy at birth and an
14We computed a mortality function with data from the Human Mortality Database for the year 2015 and
a mortality function for the year 2080 based on Eurostat’s population projections. The mortality function for
2020 was computed by a linear interpolation from the mortality functions for 2015 and 2080.
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increase of 17.7% of life expectancy at 65.







Year 2020 - gray line. Year 2080 - dashed red line
Figure 12: Survival laws
In Figure 13 we present the results of the consumer optimization problem for the base
scenario under both mortality laws.15 We observe that average labor supply and average
time spent in OJT increase slightly. This is accompanied by an increase in time dedicated
to schooling. As a result, average human capital and labor supply will be higher resulting in
higher labor income. We can identify, in this partial equilibrium analysis, a positive behavioural
effect associated with an increase in life expectancy. The consumer will invest more in human
capital accumulation and increase her labor supply at the intensive margin.
Although our model features time allocation at the intensive margin, we can make an exer-
cise to test if the consumer would be willing to increase labor supply at the extensive margin,
taking advantage of the fact that retirement is partially endogenous. We tested this for scen-
arios in which the consumer chose to withdraw from the labor market before the retirement
age R. We created two such scenarios. One of them, (Figure 14), is a case of a consumer with
15Throughout this section the gray line will always refer to the scenario with the 2020 mortality law and the
dashed red line to the scenario with the 2080 mortality law




























































Figure 13: Base scenario under different mortality laws
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a very high preference for leisure. We tested for φ = 30. In this case, with the 2020 mortality
law, the consumer would want to retire at age 62. Another case, shown in Figure 15 is a
scenario in which the educational subsidy is very generous (we set it at γe = 1.01), allowing
the consumer to plan to retire at age 64.

































































Figure 14: Higher preference for leisure under different mortality laws





























































Figure 15: Generous educational grant under different mortality laws
In both cases, the consumer decides to retire later, retiring at the legal retirement age of
66. By inspection of Table 3 we see the same pattern observed in the base scenario; an increase
in human capital investment and labor supply. This confirms the positive behavioural effect
on a longer life expectancy.
Table 3 also presents indicators for the case of a capitalization pension system with lower
taxes. We find qualitatively similar results as in the base scenario with a PAYG system, al-
though the positive behavioural effect is milder, this may be just a result of the particular
parameters used.
This section presented some results on the effects that a lower mortality rate may induce in
the consumer’s planing. Our emphasis was on the effects of a lower mortality on labor supply
and on human capital accumulation. The effect on human capital is particularly important
since in many growth models it has a pivotal role in ensuring long-run growth. If it is shown
that when people live longer they will invest more in human capital, this higher investment
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Table 3: Scenarios under different mortality laws
Base θ = 0.0, zl = 0.3598 φ = 30 γe = 1.01
2020 2080 2020 2080 2020 2080 2020 2080
Lifetime Utility -139.7 -141.8 -136.4 -139.0 -966.1 -982.7 -74.0 -75.44
Age entry lab mkt. 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Retirement age 66 66 66 66 62 66 64 66
Yrs in lab mkt. 47 47 47 47 43 47 45 47
Age at Peak h 51 51 50 50 24 26 19 19
Age at Peak sw 60 61 53 54 19 19 19 19
Age at Peak ω 55 55 52 52 19 19 19 19
Age at Min sl 35 36 29 29 19 19 19 19
Av. sl phase2 0.606 0.603 0.608 0.606 0.931 0.930 0.923 0.916
Av. sh phase 2 0.047 0.048 0.044 0.045 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
Av. sw phase 2 0.347 0.348 0.347 0.349 0.064 0.065 0.071 0.077
Av. h phase 2 0.524 0.527 0.516 0.518 0.299 0.301 0.369 0.373
π at R 39.59 39.99 39.00 39.32 3.93 4.36 5.67 6.50
a at R 3.05 3.36 8.97 9.93 2.89 2.68 16.55 17.11
may mitigate the potential adverse effects of high dependency ratios. In our model, this in-
crease in human capital would be even more beneficial since it increases the average human
capital externality and thereby increases future human capital accumulation. In all the cases
we tested human capital increased.
The model also suggests that, if the economy has a PAYG pension system, people will
want to work more, either at the intensive margin or at the extensive margin.
6 Conclusions
We built a life-cycle model for a consumer that has to choose endogenously the trajectory of
consumption and the time allocation among three margins while facing an age-dependent mor-
tality. In particular, time investing in home capital is decided throughout the entire life-cycle.
Our main analytical findings are that there is on the job training throughout all of phase
two of the life-cycle. There is no phase characterized by pure work, but it is possible to obtain
a life-cycle with temporary exits from the labor market and pure learning. For a sufficiently
decreasing human capital accumulation and a life-cycle without temporary exits from the labor
market, the peak in labor income occurs after the minimum in leisure and if the growth rate of
human capital is negative when the peak in labor income happens then it will happen before
the peak in labor supply.
On the numerical exercise, we found for the parameterizations that were tested, that the
model displays a hump-shaped profile in labor supply and labor income and a convexly shaped
profile in leisure, while consumptions is monotonous. We found that when the interest rate
decreases, the consumer substitutes leisure for human capital investment and labor supply. As
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the economy develops one should see an increase in the wage rate. A higher wage rate leads
to less labor supply and lower human capital as people will reap the benefits of a higher wage
rate by enjoying more leisure time.
An increase in mandatory schooling is effective in raising human capital and labor supply,
while an increase in the educational subsidy has the opposite effect as there is a strong income
substitution effect associated with this instrument. We tested three policies targeted to the
sustainability of the pension system: an increase in the contribution rate a decrease in the
gross replacement rate and an increase in the retirement age. All of them have negative effects
on labor supply at the intensive margin. Decreasing the gross replacement rate has also a neg-
ative effect on human capital accumulation. The model suggests that a particularly effective
policy is to increase the retirement age. It increases labor supply at the intensive margin and
average human capital, generating higher taxable labor income, it postpones the payment of
pensions and the resulting pension is slightly lower.
A capitalization pension system was also considered. We have seen that this pension system
if accompanied by a reduction in contributions, raises accumulated assets and consumption,
but human capital will be lower. However, in the transition phase between both systems,
where one generation pays a contribution rate and does not receive a pension, that generation
would substitute consumption for leisure, supplying less labor supply and investing less in
human capital which creates additional problems on the ability to raise revenues to fund the
transition phase.
Regarding the consumer’s reaction to a higher longevity, we have seen that the labor supply
increases at the intensive margin and if the consumer is not retiring at the rigidity R she will
plan to retire later. The finding that people would be willing to work more at the extensive
margin is an argument in favor of increases in the retirement age towards the sustainability of
the pension system.
The consumer also invests more in human capital when faced with a longer life expectancy.
Hence, our partial equilibrium analysis reveals a positive behavioral effect associated with




A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
The proof is divided in subsections.
I) Adjoint differential equations









































= − [r+m(τ)] λ3; (50)
II) λ0 = 1
For λ0 = 0, a λ3(R) > 0 would imply that there ∃ t1 < R : c(τ) = 0 ∀τ ∈ [t1, R] which is a
non-optimal solution, a λ3(T) < 0 would imply that there∃ t1 < R : c(τ) = +∞ ∀τ ∈ [t1, R]
which is a not a maximum. Then: λ0 = 0 implies λ3(R) = 0 and consequently ⇒ λ2(R) = 0.
Since λ1(R) = 0 this would violate Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. Then, by contradiction,
we must have λ0 = 1.
III) Feedback controls
The expression for consumption is the same regardless of the phase:
∂H
∂c
= 0 ⇔ c−σe− ∫τt ρ(θ)+m(θ)dθ − λ3 = 0 ⇔ c = (λ3e∫τt ρ(θ)+m(θ)dθ)−1/σ (51)
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The time allocation controls depend on the phase of the agent’s life-cycle and on the sign of
λ1.
III a) τ ∈ [S, R]
Case λ1 = 0
λ1(τ) = 0 ⇒ λ̇1(θ) ≤ 0 a.e. θ ∈ [τ, R] ⇒ sw(θ) ≤ 0 a.e θ ∈ [τ, R] ⇒ behaviour in τ = R.
Case λ1 > 0



















l − sh).w+ λ3
(
[r+m(τ)]a− c− z0 + d+ (1− zl)w.h.(1− s
l − sh)
)
subject to sl + sh ≤ 1 and sl > 0, sh > 0.
Let µ be the multiplier attached to sw and ζ be the multiplier attached to the constraint




ρ(θ)+m(θ)dθ − (λ2 + (1− zl)λ3)wh+ ζ = 0
λ1ξhη(s
h)ϕh−1ϕh − (λ2 + (1− zl)λ3)wh+ ζ = 0
ζµ = 0; ζ ≥ 0; µ ≥ 0
sl + sh + µ2 ≤ 1
We have then:





















(λ2 + (1− zl)λ3)wh
)1/1−ϕh
sh = 1− sl (52)
sw = 1− sl − sh sw = 0
There are, then, two possible regimes at the second phase of the life-cycle, τ ∈ [S, R] when
λ1 > 0 and that are distinguishable by wether s
w = 0 or sw ≥ 0.
III b) τ ∈ [t, S]
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[r+m(τ)]a− c− z0 + d+ γe.w.(1− s
l)
)



















sh = 1− sl sh = 1− sl
IV) Transversality conditions
We write the problem as:∫R
t
L(τ, x, u)dτ+G(xR) → max
s.t.
ẋ = f(τ, x, u) xt = x̄
Let ỹ denote a perturbation on a variable y. At the optimum, a perturbed solution must
not yield a superior result, hence we must have:∫R
t
L(τ, x̃, ũ)dτ+G(R, x̃R) −
∫R
t
L(τ, x, u)dτ−G(R, xR) ≤ 0
≈ ∆I+ ∂G(R, xR)
∂x
∆xR ≤ 0
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